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RIOS-PINEDA, et ux

1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

The CA ordered the Board of Immigration

Appeals to reopen resps' deportation proceedings, even though
resps had obtained the seven years of continuous presence

-

necessary to suspend deportation only by filing appeals and
--.
motions of questionable merit.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

wife, are
country

~

and citizens of Mexico.

i~ ith

c_r=-~

~

Resps, who are husband and
They entered this

the assistance of a paid smuggler, after the

-2-

husband, Bernardo, had already been forced to return to Mexico
once under threat of deportation.
apprehended.

Bernardo was again

The INS allowed him to leave voluntarily rather

than be deported, but when he failed to do so it instituted
deportation proceedings against both resps.

At the hearing,

resps conceded deportability but requested relief on the ground
that they had one citizen child and were expecting a second.

The

judge treated the request as one for suspension of deportation
under 8

u.s.c.

1254(a) (1).

~--------------------------

That section allows suspenion of

deportation for aliens who have been continuously present in the
Untied State for seven years and are of good moral character, and
for whom deportation would constitute extreme hardship.

The

immigration judge held that resps were ineligible because they
had not attained the necessary 7 years of continuous physical
~

presence.

~udge

In light of resps' illegal entry into the country, the

also refused to allow voluntary departure.

He ordered

resps deported.

h

.
.
.
T e~
Boar d o f Imm1grat1on
Appeals aff1rmed.

It held that

deportation, which would result in the de facto deportation of
resps' citizen child, did not violate the child's consititutional
rights.

It also rejected a 5th Amendment challenge to the

proceedings before the Immigration Judge.
Resps then filed a petn for review in CAS, renewing the
constitutional cl~ rejected by the BIA.

Without addressing

those claims, the CA noted that resps had satisfied the seven
years requirement while the petn for review was pending.
Bernardo was gainfully employed, and the couple had made a down

'
I
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.

payment on a house and now had [ t_wo

~itize.n ~ldrer.

It

concluded that resps had made a substantial showing that they
should be afforded relief on the basis of evidence not available
at the time of the intitial hearing.

The court directed the BIA

to hold the proceedings in abeyance for 60 days to allow resps to
file a motion to reopen, instructing it to "give careful and
thorough consideration to the motion to reopen if, indeed, one is
filed."
Not surprisingly, a motion to reopen was forthcoming.
BIA denied the motion and reaffirmed its earlier ruling.
the motion was not properly filed in a timely manner.

The
First,

Second,

resps had failed to make a prima facie showing of extreme
hardship.

They had submitted only vague allegations of counsel,

unspported by affidavits.

Finally, the motion should in any

event be denied in the exercise of the Board's discretion because
resps "were able to acquire 7 years of physical presence and the
additional equity of a second child only by filing what we
consider to be frivolous appeals,"

and had shown "disregard for

our immigration laws -by paying a smuggler to help them avoid
inspec;>on and by failing to depart voluntarily."
vtA8 again reversed and remanded, this time with explicit
instructions to the BIA to reopen.
timely.

First, the motion had been

Second, the CA had implicitly decided in its first

decision that resps had made out a prima facie case of extreme
hardship; that was now the law of the case.

Third, the BIA had

in any event abused its discretion in finding that resps' had
failed to make a prima facie case.

In particular, it appeared

'
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.

that Bernardo's mother, who lives in Mexico, was dependent on
resps, and that their children spoke only English.

The Board's

failure to take these factors into account was an abuse of
discretion.

Finally, the Board abused its discretion in stating

that it would not reopen the proceeedings even if resps were
considered to have made out a prima facie case of eligibility.
Assuming that the Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen
even if the prima facie case has been made, it abused that
discretion here.

Resps' appeals had not been "frivolous."

And

the Board erred in relying on resps' "disregard" of the
immigration laws, for "such disregard is necessarily present in
some form in most deportation proceedings."

These were "improper

and irrelevant" factors that should not have been considered.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

1. The ultimate relief sought by resps

(suspension of deportation) and the means of obtaining it (a
motion to reopen deportation proceedings) are designed to deal
with the extraordinary situation.

This Court has consistently

the ~eadth

of the AG's discretion in deciding whether

to reopen proceedings.

See INS v. Phinpathya, 52 USLW 4027, 4029

recognized

n. 6 ("granting of the motion [to reopen] is entirely within
BIA's discretion"); INS v. wang, 450
(1981).

u.s.

139, 143-144, and n. 5

The decision below impermissibly restricts this

discretionary authority.
2. The factors relied on by the BIA in exercising its
discretion to deny the motion to reopen regardless of whether the
I

prima facie case of eligibility had been made out were not
"improper and irrelevant."

Resps' appeals were properly

-5I

'

characterized as frivolous by the Board.

The relief obtained as

a result of the appeals was solely attributable to the delay they
caused.

The CA has essentially said that any litigation that

buys seven years' presence is not frivolous and that delay is a
valid purpose for pursuing administrative and judicial review.
Resps' disregard for the immigration laws is also a relevant
factor.

The fact that all deportable aliens have violated those

laws to some extent does not mean that the BIA, in exercising its
discretion, may not differentiate on the basis of the degree to
which they have flouted the immigration process.
3. The CA's restriction on the AG's discretionary authority
to deny motions to reopen will have serious adverse effects on
the administration of the immigration laws.

Aliens will be

/

encouraged to file frivolous motions and appeals.
impose a substantial burden on agency resources.

This will
It is

inconceivable that an alien's prolonged and willful abuse of the
immigration process is an impermissible basis for denying the
alien's request for discretionary relief.
4. Petr considers the ruling that resps had established a
prima facie showing of eligibility to be manifestly incorrect and
contrary to Wang, which took the CA to task for finding hardship
even though "the allegations were in the main conclusory and
unsupported by affidavit."

450

u.s.,

at 143.

It does not raise

this point as a separate question, however, since reversal of the
decision of the overall discretion issue would render the prima

'

facie issue moot.
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..
I

4.

DISCUSSION:

Petr's strongest argument is the one it

chooses not to pursue: that the CA erred in ruling that the prima
facie showing of hardship had been made.

That determination is

within the AG's discretionary authority.

In this regard, the

I

decision below is clearly contrary to Wang.

The issue that petr does raise -- whether the BIA abused its
discretion in denying the motion to reopen even assuming a prima
facie case of hardship had been made 1 -- is less clear, but the
CA's decision has little support.

Indeed, since the motion to

re~s a creature of regulation, and this Court has deferred
to the regulations before, the CA was not really in a position to
force the BIA to reopen proceedings when it did not want to.

The

decision below also seems inconsistent with the dicta in Wang and
Phinpathya, with the general trend of the Court's immigration
decisions, and with a number of other CAs.
INS, 715 F.2d 685 (CAl 1983)

See, e.g., LeBlanc v.

(Board may deny reopenings as a

matter of discretion, "little room for substantive judicial
review," alien's submission of frivolous motions and refusal to

(

1 There is a possible conflict as to whether the BIA has
discretion to refuse to reopen deportation proceedings if the
alien has made a prima facie showing of eligibility.
In Wang and
in another case the same day, CA9 held that it did not. CAl has
held that it does. E. g., LeBlanc v. INS, 715 F.2d 685, 692 (CAl
1983).
It seems unlikely that the CA9 ruling survives this
Court's reversal in Wang. See Augustin v. INS, 700 F.2d 564, 566
(CA9 1983) ("The Board need not consider statutory eligibility if
the alien's application would have been properly denied as a
matter of administrative discretion.")
The court below treated
this as an open question, and assumed that the Board did have the
discretion to refuse to reopen even if a prima facie case had
been made.

,

.

-7depart voluntarily support refusal); Augustin v. INS, 700 F.2d
564 (CA9 1983)

(dilatory tactics); Balani v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157

(CA6 1982); Pang Kiu v. INS, 663 F.2d 417 (CA2 1981); Lam Chuen
Ching v. INS, 467 F.2d 644 (CA2 1972)

(rejecting "the amazing

argument ... that because through the delaying tactics employed
for appellant he was able to prevent his clearly rightful
deportation for more than four years is a factor favorable to
him").
Although the decision below is fairly dubious under this
Court's precedents, it is not clear that the petn is certworthy.
At present, this is a rather narrow controversy.

CA8 and the BIA

have locked horns over resps, but there is no indication that
this is part of an ongoing struggle.

To the contrary, the cases

cited above indicate that petr generally enjoys the the most
cooperative review from the CAs.

CA8 acknowledged the Board's

discretion, it only held that in this case it was abused.
~

It

seems that CA8 would agree that bad faith delaying tactics
including frivolous appeals -- should not entitle an illegal
alien to take advantage of the 7-years presence provision.

It

just did not think those tactics were used here (a proposition
with which petr strongly disagrees).

Petr, on the other hand, is

not arguing that the 7-year period is somehow tolled during the
pendency of all legal proceedings.
is somewhat hard to pin down.

Thus, the legal disagreement

(There is a clear disagreement

over whether an alien's disregard for the immigration laws can be
I

held against him.)

Moreover, petr's claims of disruption of the

administration of the immigration laws are pro forma, and are

-8-

belied by the deference accorded the Board in other CAs.

It may

be that the Court can let this go for now and see if the decision
•

has any continuing significance.
At the least, there is a stark conflict between the
executive and the judicial branches over the extent of the AG's
discretion in this case.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

A response is certainly in order.
I recommend CFR.
There is no response.

August 13, 1984

I

Herz

Opinion in petn

lgs November 8, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Lynda
No. 83-2032 - INS v. Rios-Pineda
This case was originally scheduled for the September

24, 1984 Conference and was relisted pending receipt of a
response, which

i~

now in hand.

The case involved a couple,

illegal aliens, who through a series of frivolous appeals and
delaying tactics, succeeded in remaining in this country for
seven years.

~~-------------------~--------------

CA8 then held that because they had stayed the

statutory length of time, they were entitled to remain.

It paid

only lip service to the Board of Immigration Appeals' discretion
not to reopen a deportation suit.

The INS petitioned for cert,

and resps have now responded.
In a mostly irrelevant and incoherent

brief~

resps
L

argue primarily that the petn should be denied because it is
jurisdictionally out of time.

They contend that the issue raised

in the petn was addressed by CA8 in its first opinion ordering a
remand in March 1982; the INS was required to petn for cert from
that opinion to be timely on the issue raised.

Because it waited

instead to petn from the second CA8 opinion, its petn is JOT.
This argument is ridiculous.

- -

The second CA8 opinion formed the

basis for the INS's petn, and it was timely filed.

The rest of

the response consists of rehashing what the BIA and CA8 ruled.
I recommend that you vote to grant.

November 21, 1984
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